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Abstract 
This brief piece of research tracks the 
patterns in the Federal Trade Commis 
sion's (FTC) issuance of off icial deceptive 
practices complaints and the changes that 
occur with partisan transitions in the 
White House. Generally, it is found, the 
FTC issues an increasing number of of 
ficial complaints each year there is a Re 
publican President and a declining 
number in each year there is a Democratic 
President. Activity during the Truman ad 
ministration provides the only systematic 
deviation from this pattern. 
A look at the literature on deceptive 
practices regulation provides an explana 
tion for the overall pattern. And, a look 
at the historical record provides plausible 
explanations for both the Truman-era 
deviations and the question of how 
Presidents are able to exert their in 
fluence. Suggestions for future research 
by Presidential scholars are presented. 
One of the major goals of the architects 
of our system of regulatory commissions 
was to insulate the administration of cer 
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tain policies from political influences.1 
But, for both legal and political reasons, 
Presidents are active in the affairs of "in 
dependent" regulatory commissions and 
the commissions' areas of policy responsi 
bility.2 As Kohlmeier puts it, "the known 
evidence of interventions from Wilson to 
Nixon demonstrates that Presidents, Dem 
ocratic or Republican, have not disasso 
ciated themselves from the substance of 
regulation."3 The President has such an 
influence upon the commissions that 
Bernstein concludes that "independence 
of commissions from executive control 
has become highly qualified."4 Kohlmeier 
is more definitive when he asserts, "the 
politics of regulation begins at the White 
House."5 
As Presidential administrations change, 
particularly when the party in the White 
House changes, the activities or policy 
decisions of regulatory commissions 
might also be expected to change. Wel 
born notes: 
New administrations . . . come to 
power with a sense of regulatory prob 
lems informed by party orientations on 
economic questions and stimulated by 
the interests to which they are sensitive. 
When party control changes in transi 
tion, the pressures are that much 
stronger.6 
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This research seeks to outline the pat 
tern in one particular area of regulatory 
activity over a thirty-seven year span and 
to focus particularly on the differences 
found when Democrats or Republicans 
occupy the White House. Specifically, 
this work looks at the changes in the Fed 
eral Trade Commission's (FTC) issuance 
of deceptive practices complaints when 
the party in the White House changes 
from 1938 to 1974. Although this study is 
narrow in scope, it suggests important 
and neglected lines of research for those 
interested in Presidential policy-making, 
regulatory politics in general, and the 
FTC in particular. Before examining these 
changes, however, a brief outline of the 
FTC's responsibilities and enforcement 
efforts is in order. 
The FTC and Deceptive Practices 
The FTC is charged with implementing 
the premise that "the consumer is to be 
assured full and accurate information 
which will permit him to make a reasoned 
choice in the marketplace."7 Based on this 
charge, the FTC took jurisdiction over 
advertising practices to protect the public 
interest. In 1931, though, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the FTC lacked jurisdic 
tion over false advertising unless it could 
first prove that the advertising damaged 
competition or competitor.8 Only then 
did the public interest become an issue. 
The Court did suggest, however, that the 
Commission appeal to Congress for 
broader powers. Subsequently, Congress 
passed the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, 
which made "unfair methods and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in com 
merce" unlawful.9 Thus, the Commission 
was specifically empowered to "center its 
attention on the direct protection of the 
consumer."10 
The basic means by which the FTC 
sought to exercise this explicit power from 
1938 through 1974 was by means of the is 
suance of an official complaint.11 Appli 
cations for complaints are filed in large 
numbers by businesses, consumers, and 
FTC staffers who allege violations of 
Wheeler-Lea. Only a fraction of these ap 
plications, however, is selected for action 
in the form of the issuance of a formal 
complaint by the FTC. These are chosen 
at the discretion of the Commission, and 
thus these choices are subject to political 
influences. 
As noted earlier, Welborn's analysis 
suggests that these political influences 
may run along party lines.12 "Common 
knowledge" might suggest, then, that 
under the relatively "pro-business" 
Republican Presidents, the FTC would 
issue fewer complaints; under the more 
regulation-oriented, "anti-business" Dem 
ocratic Presidents, the FTC would issue 
more complaints. There is evidence, 
though, that in regard to the policy focus 
of this research, Republicans may be 
more supportive of issuing official com 
plaints than are Democrats. Nadel notes 
that: 
The commission became increasingly 
involved in false advertising cases . . . 
In its approach to this area, the FTC 
was in no way antibusiness. Rather, the 
aim of its policies was to protect com 
petitors rather than consumers . . . The 
commission was therefore more of a 
participant in a system of self-regula 
tion than an exclusive regulator itself.13 
Stone summarizes his arguments along 
the same line by stating that "business 
sought administrative protection against 
conduct which was bad for the industry as 
a whole or which was uneconomic."14 In 
light of these arguments, to the extent that 
Republicans are pro-business, they would 
be expected to support FTC activity in the 
deceptive practices policy area. Thus, this 
research examines the proposition that the 
annual number of official deceptive prac 
tices complaints issued will vary with the 
party in the White House, increasing 
when Republican Presidents are in office, 
declining when Democratic Presidents are 
in office. If changes appear in the FTC's 
issuance of deceptive practices complaints 
corresponding to party turnover in the 
White House, it will suggest a relationship 
between the partisan occupation of the 
White House and the regulatory policy in 
the areas of deceptive practices. 
Data 
The number of official complaints 
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issued charging any form of false adver 
tising and/or misrepresentation under 
Secton 5 of the FTC Act as amended by 
Wheeler-Lea is collected by year from the 
"Federal Trade Commission Docket of 
Complaints" in the Trade Regulation Re 
porter published by the Commerce Clear 
ing House. The time period covered, 1938 
to 1974, includes the entire span when the 
issuance of official complaints was the 
major enforcement tool in this policy area 
for the FTC. Over this time span, four 
distinct periods of partisan control of the 
White House are present: 1938-1952, 
1953-1960, 1961-1968, and 1969-1974. 
Findings 
Figure 1 graphically shows the number 
of official complaints issued annually. 
The data points show a wide fluctuation 
in activity from a zenith of 374 official 
complaints issued in 1940 to a nadir of 30 
in 1947. Overall, however, there appears 
to be a downward trend in activity.15 
More to the point of this research, 
however, Figure 1 is divided into four 
parts to reflect the partisan control of the 
White House during the time period 
covered. Additionally, trend lines are 
drawn for each period of partisan control 
to summarize the overall direction in the 
number of official complaints issued 
within each set of years.16 
A comparison of the trends across 
periods of different partisan control of 
the White House reveals patterns consis 
tent with the proposition stated earlier. 
The trend in the number of official decep 
tive practices complaints issued goes 
sharply downward during Democratic ad 
ministrations and rises notably during Re 
publican administrations. 
After the immediate burst of activity 
that might be expected to follow the ad 
vent of newly clarified authority, the FTC 
issued significantly fewer official com 
plaints through the Roosevelt-Truman ad 
ministrations. The high and low points of 
activity noted earlier both came during 
this period. On the average, each succeed 
ing year from 1938 through 1952 saw ap 
proximately twenty fewer official com 
plaints issued than the previous year. This 
average decline is present in spite of an 
upward trend found at the end of this 
Democratic era when Truman held office. 
If one separates the Roosevelt and Tru 
man years, the average decline during the 
Roosevelt years is approximately thirty 
three official complaints per year and the 
average increase during the Truman years 
is approximately seven cases per year. 
Thus, while the findings hold with the ex 
pectation for Democratic Presidents, FTC 
activity clearly deviates from expectations 
during the Truman administration. Dur 
ing that time the trend in activity is more 
like what is expected during Republican 
administrations. 
The Eisenhower Republican era pro 
duces a significant upward trend in offi 
cial complaints issued as per the expecta 
tions. On the average, the FTC issued 
approximately sixteen more complaints 
during each year of the Eisenhower ad 
ministration than it had in each previous 
year. Furthermore, the data points cluster 
very closely around the trend line and ex 
hibit none of the divergence noted during 
the Roosevelt-Truman era. It should be 
noted, however, that the upward trend 
during the Eisenhower era is much 
sharper than the trend noted during 
Truman's tenure. However 
"Republican 
like" the FTC activities were when Eisen 
hower took office, they were transformed 
even more away from the Roosevelt Dem 
ocratic pattern during Eisenhower's time 
in the White House. 
The downward trend during Demo 
cratic administrations is reestablished 
during the Kennedy-Johnson period. The 
FTC issued an average of eleven fewer 
complaints in each succeeding year of this 
time span. Furthermore, although the 
data points do not cluster as tightly 
around the trend line as they did during 
the Eisenhower era, there is no apparent 
break in the trend between the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations as was 
found between the Roosevelt and Truman 
years. By the end of this period the 
number of FTC official deceptive prac 
tices complaints issued had fallen to a 
level unseen since the advent of the Eisen 
hower administration. 
Finally, the Nixon-Ford administra 
tions (through 1974) produce the charac 
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Figure 1 
Official Deceptive Practices Complaints Issued 
Roosevelt-Truman 
by the FTC, 1938-74 
Kennedy-Johnson i Nixon-Ford 
-i?i?i?i?i???i?i?i?i?i?i?ri r 
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 
n?i?i?i?i?r 
54 56 58 
YEARS 
n?r~r 
62 64 
n?i?r 
66 68 
n?i?i?r 
70 72 74 
teristic Republican upswing. The increase 
averages, however, only approximately 
six official complaints issued per year. 
This is far below the trend noted during 
Eisenhower's terms and is more in line 
with what was observed during the 
Truman years. 
Discussion 
In sum, the proposition advanced 
earlier that the volume of official decep 
tive practice complaints issued by the FTC 
would decline during Democratic admin 
istrations and rise during Republican ad 
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ministrations is generally confirmed. The 
years of differing partisan control reveal 
clear trends in the data. The views of 
Nadel and Stone concerning this particu 
lar area of regulation appear to be con 
firmed. Likewise, Welborn's idea of the 
importance of partisan change in the 
White House is confirmed in these policy 
outputs. Nevertheless, at least two items 
remain for discussion. First, how can one 
explain the uncharacteristic upward trend 
during the Truman years? Second, how 
do partisan changes in the White House 
lead to policy output changes? 
To address these questions we focus on 
"the principal tool of presidential influ 
ence . . . the appointing process"17 and ex 
amine the relevant historical record pro 
vided by Graham and Kramer.18 Their 
valuable work offers plausible answers to 
both questions. First, Graham and 
Kramer note that "Truman inherited an 
inbred and moribund FTC"19 which he 
was forced to change, in spite of his in 
terest in the status quo, because of death, 
resignation, and rejection of a continua 
tion by the U.S. Senate of incumbent 
Commissioners.20 In essence, then, the 
answer to the first question appears to be 
that it was impossible for the trend 
established during the Roosevelt years to 
continue. Any further diminution of ac 
tivity would have meant total inactivity. 
Therefore the appointment of almost any 
living person to the FTC by Truman was 
bound to interject a noticeable amount of 
energy. In this sense the upswing in FTC 
activity during the Truman years may be 
viewed as a natural return to a minimal 
level of activity that might be expected 
from a body with the FTC's responsibili 
ties. By appointing commissioners with at 
least a "modicum of competence,"21 
Truman slightly revived a comatose com 
mission in which "Roosevelt, by all ac 
counts, lost interest."22 
Furthermore, Truman is responsible 
for a reform that suggests an answer for 
the second query. Truman's Reorganiza 
tion Plan 8 of 1950 provided for the chair 
men of the regulatory commissions to be 
"appointed by the President and serve at 
his pleasure."23 Thus, each partisan Presi 
dential transition included in this analysis 
was accompanied by a change in the 
chairmanship of the FTC. The FTC, more 
than any of the other regulatory commis 
sions, has given general executive powers 
to its chairman and thereby increased his 
powers.24 It seems plausible to argue, 
then, that even though Presidents may not 
be acutely concerned with the FTC or de 
ceptive practices enforcement, the differ 
ent orientations of Democratic and Re 
publican Presidents in this regulatory pol 
icy area lead them to name different types 
of chairmen who can then exercise their 
executive powers to effect policy outputs 
consistent with partisan preferences. 
Implications 
This work suggests several potentially 
profitable lines of research for scholars 
interested in the Presidency, policy mak 
ing, and regulation. First, it is clear that 
the President does have an influence on 
what the FTC does in deceptive practices 
enforcement. Other commissions and 
other areas of policy responsibility could 
be examined to ascertain whether or not 
Presidential influence is more broadly 
manifest. 
Of course, broader examinations could 
also try to assess the relative impact of 
other actors in the policy process vis-a-vis 
the President. Those who subscribe to 
Seidman's position that "these commis 
sions have been transformed into arms of 
Congress"25 would certainly expect some 
impact from that branch of government. 
A comparison of Presidential and Con 
gressional influences could add to the lit 
erature which seeks to ascertain whether 
the President or Congress is "closer" to 
these "independent" commissions.26 
Likewise, those who see the intended 
subjects of regulation as "owning," unduly 
influencing, co-opting, or "capturing" the 
regulatory commissions27 might seek to 
measure group impact on regulatory 
policy vis-a-vis the President's. This could 
lead to a more explicit description of how 
interest groups work through and in 
fluence Presidential policy making on 
these matters. 
In sum, this work suggest that Presi 
dential scholars might be well advised to 
seek patterns and changes in policy out 
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puts as indicators of Presidential effect. 
By examining policy outputs over time, as 
is done here with official deceptive prac 
tice complaints, the actions of individual 
Presidents can be placed in context, and 
important forces, such as partisanship, 
will emerge as explanatory variables. 
Even when such broad explanations are 
not possible, tracking policy outputs over 
time could alert scholars to important 
changes which occurred and focus efforts 
for those seeking to explain the historical 
import of particular Presidents. 
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